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IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
ATKIN, WRIGHT & MILES, ) 
Chartered, a Utah corporation,) 
) 
Plaintiff - Respondent, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE ) 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, et.al.,) 
) 
Defendant - Appellant. ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 18232 
NATURE OF CASE 
Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, brought this action 
against The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company to 
(1) obtain an injunction prohibiting Mountain Bell from changing 
the telephone number used by Atkin, Wright & Miles, and (2) for 
damages which resulted after the number was changed, including 
the placement of mechanical and "live" intercepts on the 
number designated for the law firm in Mountain Bell's Tela Lease 
Agreement and in the 1980 Southern Utah Telephone Directory. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court denied Mountain Bell's motion to dismiss 
the Complaint, or to limit liability, and proceeded with a jury 
trial. The jury found in favor of Plaintiff and against Defen-
dant and returned a verdict against Mountain Bell in the sum of 
$25,000 compensatory damages, and $30,000 punitive damages. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Mt. Bell seeks to reverse the judgment of the trial court. 
Atkin, Wright & Miles seeks to affirm the jury verdict. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Atkin, Wright & Miles is a small law firm located in St. 
George, Utah. Prior to the formation of the law firm, J. 
MacArthur Wright was using the telephone numbers of 673-4606 and 
673-4607 (T.381). When he and Mr. J. Ralph Atkin formed the new 
firm of Atkin & Wright, they desir~d to retain the use of those 
numbers and negotiated with Dennis Wood, St. George Manager of 
Mt. Bell specifically for those numbers, Dennis Wood, for Mt. 
Bell agreed and did assign to them 673-4605, 4606, 4607 and 
4608. This was the only way to preserve those two numbers and 
still have a 4-line rotary capability (T.382, 563). Those 
negotiations were reduced to writing in the "Tela Lease," 
( T. 5 4 6 , Exh. 6) . In that instrument, the lessee/customer is 
designated as "Atkin & Wright, Attys. ", with the telephone 
number of 673-4605 designated as part of the lease. 
When the telephone directory for October 1980, 
published, all listings in the white pages for 
(Exh. 1) was 
St. George 
attorneys were listed correctly. Likewise, in the yellow pages 
(Exh. 1, p.206), the telephone number of Atkin, Wright & Miles 
was correctly listed as 673-4605, but through a mistake on the 
part of Mt. Bell, this same number was listed for the law firm 
of Allen, Thompson & Hughes across from the name of Michael D. 
Hughes, followed by the correct number for Allen, 
Thompson & Hughes, 673-4892 (T.47-76). The Allen law firm was 
local counsel for Mt. Bell in the St. George area (T.67). 
After the telephone books were delivered to the local 
customers, Mr. Hughes, on behalf of the Allen firm, protested to 
2 
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Mt. Bell. The two law firms attempted to resolve this matter 
through consultation and correspondence (T.186, Exh. 7). 
With the threat of a lawsuit from the Allen firm alleging 
damages of some $300, 000, Mr. Kenneth Madsen, general counsel 
for Mt. Bell, became involved. He met with Atkin, Wright & 
Miles and other solutions were P.roposed by them (T.193-194; 
199-200). However, Mr. Madsen acted as the "Solomon" (T.176), 
arbitrarily making the decision to change the telephone number 
assigned to Atkin, Wright & Miles from 673-4605 to 628-2612 and 
to place 673-4605 on a mechanical intercept (T.566). The 
intercept installed on October 22, 1980 (R.5, T.270), with only 
minutes of advance notice (T.208). However, Mt. Bell did not 
first seek the approval of the Public Service Commission (T.582-
583) . 
Even though Atkin, Wright & Miles had contracted with 
Mt. Bell to use four individual lines, the mechanical intercept 
was placed only on 673-4605 and not the remaining three numbers 
(T.572). If someone called 673-4605 while the mechanical 
intercept was playing, the system did not rotate up to the next 
three lines. The caller would receive a busy signal and would 
have to call back, or simply not call at all (T.574). If the 
caller dialed 673-4606, 4607 or 4608, he was told that these 
numbers had been disconnected. (T. 5 7 4, Exh. 13 & 14) . Thus, 
the incoming telephone lines to Atkin, Wright and Miles were 
reduced by Mt. Bell's intercept from four operating lines to one 
intercepted line (T.574-576). By reason of that initial 
intercept, Atkin, Wright & Miles claim a breach of the Tela 
3 
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Lease contract and for damages resulting from that breach. 
Atkin, Wright & Miles hurriedly obtained a temporary 
restraining order directing Mt. Bell to remove the intercept 
(R. 1, 2, 4, 5) . The temporary restraining order was served upon 
Mt. Bell immediately (T.567-568), but it was not removed until 
some 36 hours thereafter (T.272), even though it could have been 
removed within one-half hour (T.567). 
Every call to Atkin, Wright & Miles was intercepted and 
the intercept message gave the caller the option of calling 
Atkin, Wright & Miles, or the competing law firm, which 
represented Mt. Bell on a local level. Thus, every call to 
Respondent was adversely affected but only calls for Mr. Hughes 
(one per day, Exh. 7) were affected by the intercept. Further-
more, the number assigned to Atkin, Wright & Miles, 628-2612, 
was a number with a new prefix (the prefix "673-" having been a 
long established prefix in St. George), giving the appearance 
that Atkin, Wright & Miles was a new law firm. 
Mt. Bell moved to dissolve the temporary restraining order 
and to deny the request for a preliminary injunction. When the 
Court indicated at the hearing that it would take the matter 
under advisement, Appellant moved to have its own motions denied 
(R 68-69). Accordingly, both motions were denied (R.47-48). 
Since there was some indication that the telephone service 
would be interrupted, Atkin, Wright & Miles directed their sec-
retaries to maintain records concerning incoming calls prior to 
the time the intercept was placed on its line and to keep track 
of incoming calls after the intercept (T.332; Exh. 19-20). 
4 
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Those records indicate that on Oct. 20th, (two days before 
the intercept), 55 calls were received (T.335). Until noon of 
Oct. 23rd, (the day after the intercept and before removal), two 
calls were received (no records were kept for the afternoon.) 
(T.336). After the intercept was removed 57 calls were received 
on the first full day following removal (T.336, Exh. 21). 
Until the mechanical intercept was removed some 36 hours 
after being installed, all incoming callers were given the new 
number of Atkin, Wright & Miles of 628-2612. When the intercept 
was removed pursuant to court order, no intercept was 
placed on 628-2612, and thus a caller who had been given that 
number during the 36 hour period received the following recorded 
message: "628-2612 has been disconnected" (T.577). Thus, a 
client or potential client may have thought that the law firm of 
Atkin, Wright & Miles was no longer in business, or perhaps, had 
lost its telephone service for non-payment. 
After the trial court granted Appellant's own motion to 
deny its request to vacate the preliminary injunction (R.47-48, 
76-78), Mt. Bell petitioned this court for an extraordinary writ 
or for interlocutory appeal (R.52-66). That request was denied 
by this court (R.171). 
Thereafter, the Allen firm filed a petition with the Public 
Service Commission (PSC) requesting that the telephone number of 
673-4605 be placed on intercept (Exh. 24, T.243, 702-703). 
Appellant actively supported and encouraged the petition. 
Over the objection of Atkin, Wright & Miles, the PSC 
directed that a "live" intercept be placed on 673-4605. The 
5 
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installation of a live intercept occurred on Feb. 27, 1981 (Exh. 
17, T.459). After that time, anyone dialing 673-4605, should 
have received a live operator to challenge the caller regarding 
the party or law firm sought. However, it did not work 
properly, as shown hereinafter. 
After the Supreme Court refus~d to vacate the preliminary 
injunction issued in October, 1980, Mt. Bell published a news 
article in the Nov. 18, 1980 edition of the Spectrum (Exh. 16). 
That article stated in part as follows: 
Clients should dial the firm of Allen, Thompson & Hughes at 
673-4892 and the firm of Atkin, Wright & Miles at 673-4605. 
However, when the PSC ordered the live intercept (which 
became effective on Feb. 27, 1981), Mt. Bell failed to make any 
public announcements, including "stuffers" in its monthly bill-
ings, that Atkin, Wright & Miles' telephone number haq been 
changed to 628-2612 (T.225-226). 
The intercept operators were located in Denver, Colorado and 
were apparently given instructions by Mt. Bell as to how to 
answer intercepted calls. If the caller was simply try-
ing to locate an attorney for the first time, the telephone 
numbers for both firms were sometimes given. Many problems 
occurred through the use of live operators. Some of these 
abuses were recorded by Atkin, Wright & Miles and played to the 
jury at the time of trial (Exh. 13). 
The first portion of Exhibit 13 concerns problems created by 
the first intercept, i.e. busy signals or that "673-4606, 4607 
and 4608 have been disconnected." The remaining taped portion of 
Exhibit 13 deals with the inadequate service of the 1ive 
6 
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intercept. The tape can be summarized as follows: 
FIRST CALLS MADE (February 27, 1981, the day the live 
intercept was installed). 
First Dial: Dialed 673-4605 (old number); telephone rang 3 
times with no answer and "cut off". 
Second Dial: Dialed 673-4605, live operator responded and 
said "What party are you calling?" When the 
caller indicated he just wanted an attorney, 
he was cut off. 
Third Dial: Dialed 673-4605, number of Mr. Atkin given, 
caller asked to repeat telephone number, but 
was cut off prior to receiving same. 
Fourth Dial: Dialed 673-4605, operator answered and said 
"One moment please", wait of approximately 
1 minute with no answer from operator there-
after. No information provided by operator. 
Fifth Dial: Dialed 673-4605, 3 rings, Mr. Hughes phone 
number given correctly. 
Sixth Dial: Dialed 673-4605, no response and "cut off". 
Seventh Dial: Dialed 673-4606, received satisfactory 
response. 
SECOND CALLS (Exact date not indicated on tape.) 
First Dial: Dialed 673-4605, operator asked "Who are you 
calling?", caller was cut oft. 
Second Dial: Dialed 673-4605, operator asked "Which 
attorney do you want?", caller cut off. 
Third Dial: Dialed 673-4605, caller cut off. 
Fourth Dial: Dialed 673-4605, operator answered, caller 
cut off before receiving correct phone no. 
THIRD CALLS (March 2, 1981) 
First Dial: Dialed 673-4605, no ring, no response. 
Second Dial: Dialed 673-4605, no ring, no response. 
Third Dial: Dialed 673-4605, no ring, no response. 
Fourth Dial: Dialed 673-4606, no ring, no response. 
Fifth Dial: Dialed 673-4605, received busy signal. 
Sixth Dial: Dialed 673-4605, received busy signal. 
Seventh Dial: Dialed 673-4605, no ring, no response. 
Eighth Dial: Dialed 673-4605, no ring, no response. 
FOURTH CALLS (Exact date not indicated on tape.) 
First Dial: Dialed 673-4605, cut off before dialing 
digit number "5". 
Second Dial: Dialed 673-4605, cut off before dialing 
digit number "5". 
Third Dial: Dialed 673-4605, operator asked, "What number 
are you calling?"; caller said "673-4605"; 
operator asked, "What attorney do you want?"; 
caller answered, "I am looking for my 
attorney."; operator responded, "Are you 
going to give me his name or not?" Correct 
phone number finally given to caller. 
Fourth Dial: Dialed 673-4605, received operator, but cut 
off before receiving any number. 
FIFTH CALLS (June 26, 1981) 
7 
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Ii 
First Dial: 
Second Dial: 
SIXTH CALLS 
First Dial: 
At the time 
Dialed 673-4605, received taped message that 
"673-4605 is not in service." 
Dialed 673-4606, received taped message that 
"673-4606 is not in service." 
(July 6 I 1981) 
Dialed 673-4605, after some confusion, 
received correct phone number. 
of trial, Atkin, Wright & Miles called as 
witnesses clients, public officials, and fellow attorneys, who 
testified concerning the difficul~ies they encountered when 
calling the law firm, with both types of intercepts. That 
testimony indicated the following: 
1. The County Clerk, Marjorie Howell, called 
673-4605 numerous times atter the second intercept and was 
advised that the number had been disconnected or was not in 
service (T.116-117). Even after she finally got through, 
the telephone rang with no answer when dialing 673-4605 
(T.119). 
2. Mr. Wadsworth testified he called at least a 
dozen times, every halt hour and was never able to get 
through on that particular day. At the time he was 
restricted to bed (T.122). 
3. Mr. Morrison testified that on April 4, 1981, 
(after the second intercept) he called 673-4605 after 
getting the number from the telephone book. When 
calling, the telephone rang and rang with no answer, 
so he called the operator and, " She was tart with me, 
belligerent, and says she didn't know anything about any 
number change. I had to get in my automobile twice that day 
and drive to the office because I couldn't get the number." 
(T.278). 
He also indicated he had trouble for several days in a 
row and that it upset him and his wife (T.280). 
4. Mr. Richard C. Hunter, a gentlemen confined to 
a wheelchair and dependent on the telephone, testified 
that sometime near March 3, 1981, he tried to call on 
numerous occasions and received no answer or intercept 
(T.290). He also indicated he sent his secretary to 
get the number, thereafter lost it and called information 
and received no " referring number" . ( T . 2 9 1 ) . 
5. Reah Canfield testified that she had difficulty 
getting ahold of John L. Miles and had she not prepaid 
for having her wills prepared, she would have had someone 
else do the work (T.297-299). 
6. Alan Boyack, an attorney in St. George, testified 
he tried to call Atkin, Wright & Miles for some time and was 
unable to get through, so he got in his car and traveled to 
the law office to find out what was wrong with the telephone 
system (T. 87). 
8 
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Evidence was also presented concerning damages on the part 
of Atkin, Wright & Miles, including computations indicating a 
reduction in gross revenue (T.519-537, Exh. 27) after the 
intercepts were installed. Additionally, testimony indicated 
that all of the office supplies with the telephone number 
673-4605 required replacement, and thus, special damages were 
I 
established in the approximate sum of $400.00 (T.507, 508, 
514-51 7, Exh s. 2 8 , 2 9, 3 0, 31 , 3 2) . 
At a hearing held March 20, 1981, when Mr. Madsen, attorney 
for the Appellant was reminded, again, of the malfunctions of the 
live intercept, after first denying any problems existed and he 
was then asked if he didn't think the telephone company had a 
duty to make a good faith effort to see that the intercept was 
working properly, he resonded, "Nope!". Upon being asked the 
second time, he repeated the one-word response, "Nope" 
(T.410-412). 
The jury returned a verdict in the sum of $25, 000 as corn-
pensatory damages and $30,000 as punitive damages. It is this 
judgment that Atkin, Wright & Miles seeks to have affirmed by 
this Court, plus an award of attorney fees. 
I. ESTABLISHED RULES OF APPELLATE REVIEW, BUTTRESSED BY THE 
PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE JURY, REQUIRE THE AFFIRMANCE 
OF THE JURY'S VERDICT. TARIFFS MUST BE CONSTRUED AGAINST 
APPELLANT. 
On appeal from a judgment for Plaintiff, the Supreme Court 
is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the Plaintiff (Powers v. Taylor 14 Utah 2d 152, 379 P. 2d 380, 
1963; Oberhansly v. Earle, Utah, 572 P.2d 1384). If the record 
contains substantial evidence to support the verdict, the Supreme 
9 
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Court will not disturb the judgment (First Security Bank of Utah 
v. J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc. Case No. 17270 filed July 20, 1982). 
When the Supreme Court finds there is doubt as to whether reason-
able minds might arrive at different conclusions, then the matter 
presents a question of fact that should be determined by a jury 
(Winsness v. M.J. Conoco Distributors, Inc. Utah, 1979, 593 P.2d 
1303). 
In Powers, supra, this Court noted: 
it is the jury's prerogative as the trier of the 
facts to assess the damages, and that because of its 
advantaged position in close proximity to the trial, the 
parties and the witnesses, its findings thereon will not be 
disturbed so long as there is any reasonable basis in the 
evidence to support them. 
In this same case, the court noted that the action of the 
trial court in modifying or confirming the jury verdict adds 
some verity to the judgment, citing Geary v. Cain 69 Utah 340, 
255 P. 418. Here, the unanimous jury verdict was allowed to 
stand unmodified by the trial judge, who commended the jury for 
being attentive and conscientious. (T. 784). 
The collective judgment of an eight member jury should.not 
be easily altered. In Snyderville Transportation Co., Inc. v. 
Christiansen 609 P.2d 939 (Utah, 1980) this Court said: 
We first note that the decisions reached by a jury, acting 
as sole finder of fact, are to be accorded due deference by 
a reviewing court. Such deference must necessarily extend 
to a jury's conclusion regarding the damages suffered by 
the plaintiff. 
In order to reverse, the Supreme Court must find the 
evidence "such that all reasonable minds must necessarily so 
conclude" that Respondent failed to prove its cause of action by 
a preponderance of the evidence (Howarth v. Ostergaard 30 Utah 
10 
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2d 183, 515 P.2d 442, 1973). 
Tariffs upon which Appellant relies, if applicable, are to 
be construed against Mt. Bell. Josephson v. Mountain Bell (Utah, 
1978) 576 P.2d 850 states: 
Defendant phone company bases its defense in part upon 
tariffs filed with the Public Service Commission 
With respect to those tariffs, these observations are 
pertinent. They are filed by'the utilities themselves and 
thus mainly serve their own interests. They should be 
construed strictly against the utility; and the utility 
should be required to strictly comply with them; and they 
must be fair, reasonable and lawful. 
The evidence produced at trial was substantial, persuasive 
and clearly supportive of the jury's verdict. Viewed in the 
light required on appeal, it dictates that the jury verdict be 
affirmed. 
II. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION DOES NOT HAVE JURIS-
DICTION OVER MT. BELL'S YELLOW PAGE BUSINESS AND THE TARIFF 
LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY DO NOT APPLY. 
Mr. Madsen correctly testified that the Public Service 
Commission has no jurisdiction over Mt. Bell's "Yellow Page" 
business (T 72-74). It is well established that a regulatory 
body which is created by and derives its powers and duties from 
statutes has no inherent regulatory powers, but only those which 
are expressly granted. "The rule is fundamental that restraints 
or duties imposed by law must be clear and unequivocal." Basin 
Flying Service v. Public Service Commission 531 P.2d 1303, 1305 
(Utah, 1975). 
The general grant of jurisdiction to the Public Service 
Commission is Section 54-4-1, U.C.A., giving regulatory power 
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over every public utility. The term "public utility" is defined 
in Section 54-2-1 (30) to include a telephone corporation. A 
"telephone corporation" is defined in Section 54-2-1 (22) to 
include every entity "owning, controlling, operating or managing 
any telephone line for public service". The term "telephone 
line" is defined in Section 54-2-1(21) to include all fixtures, 
equipment, etc. necessary to facilitate communication by tele-
phone. 
The selling of advertising in the "Yellow Pages" is a 
nonutility function. The legislature recognized that public 
utilities might engage in other business and provided in Section 
54-2-1(30) that: 
Any corporation or person not engaged in business exclusive-
ly as a public utility as hereinbefore defined shall be 
governed by the provisions of this title in respect only to 
the public utility or' public utilities owned, controlled, 
operated or managed by it or by him, and not in respect to 
any other business or pursuit. 
In Classified Directory Subscribers Association v. Public 
Service Commission of the District of Columbia 383 F.2d 510 (D.C. 
Cir. 1967), the Court affirmed the order of the Commission find-
ing that it did not have jurisdiction over advertising published 
in the "Yellow Pages" because that function was not essential to 
telephone service. The Court of Appeals noted that "in only one 
State, California, has a regulatory commission or a state court 
found that the rates of classified advertising are subject to 
comprehensive regulation." For example, other courts holding 
that "Yellow Pages" are not subject to Commission regulation 
include Pilot Industries v. Southern Bell Telephone And Telegraph 
Company 495 F. Supp. 356 (S.C. 1979); State ex rel. Mountain 
12 
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States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. District Court 160 Mont. 443, 
503 P.2d 526 (1972); and McTighe v. New England Telephone And 
Telegraph Company 216 F.2d 26 (2nd Cir. 1954) where the Court 
stated: 
The publication of the classified directory, however, is 
wholly a matter of private contract and contracts relating 
thereto are not required to be filed with the Public Service 
Commission which has no jurisdiction except over matters 
relating to the public utility services rendered by the 
company and the rates relative thereto. 
Appellant, on pages 34-36 of its Brief, attempts to mislead 
this Court into believing that the tariffs therein cited apply to 
this case and limit the Appellant's liability. The only error, 
insofar as this case is concerned, was made in the bold type 
listing of Respondent's number after the name of Michael D. 
Hughes, a member of the firm Allen, Thompson & Hughes. Ap-
pellants quote a portion of Allen v. General Telephone Co. 20 
Wash. App. 144, 578 P.2d 1333 (1978) to support their assertion, 
but that case actually supports Respondent's contention that the 
error in this case is beyond the jurisdiction of the Public 
Service Commission so tha.t the tariffs do not apply. In Allen, 
the court reviewed the cases from other jurisdictions, categor-
ized them, and then formulated a hybrid ruling. Instead of 
saying that only the white pages are governed by the tariffs or 
that the "Yellow Pages" are a matter of private contract, the 
Washington court held that: 
Thus, we hold that under Washington law, the initial 
yellow-page listing in standard-size print is an essential 
part of the telephone company's directory service in aid of 
its primary business of transmitting messages and is subject 
to public regulation. To this extent we disagree with those 
courts which hold that all yellow-page services are a matter 
13 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of private contract. 
This ruling is virtually identical to the statement in 74 
Arn. Jur. 2d Telecommunications, Section 32, page 333 that: 
In the typical classified telephone directory, or the 
"yellow pages" section of a directory there are four basic 
types of listings: ( 1) alphabetical lightfaced-type list-
ings (for which there is usually no charge) ; ( 2) alpha-
betical boldfaced-type listings; ( 3) alphabetical in-column 
business card listings; and (4)'display advertising. It has 
been held that while the sta.te public service commission has 
jurisdiction to regulate type (1) matters, it does not have 
jurisdiction over types (2), (3), and (4). 
The error in this case was a type ( 4) listing error for 
which an advertising charge is made (T. 72) so that even under 
Appellent's own case, there would be no PSC jurisdiction, making 
the tariff limitations inapplicable. The reasons given in the 
cases for this distinction is that the PSC has power to regulate 
the furnishing of services, but advertising, apart from the 
lightfaced free listing, is not a "service" rendered by a util-
ity. Other non-utility businesses may, and sometimes do, publish 
competitive directories. 
This case can be accurately analogized to a situation 
involving the Capitol Legal Directory or the Utah State Bar 
Directory. Suppose the number of Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
532-1234 (T. 68), was listed after the name of Michael D. Hughes. 
Even if Mr. Hughes protested as vigorously as he did in this case 
(one Mt. Bell employee said he was so angry that he would have 
shot them if he'd had a gun!, ~. 691) , what would the Capitol 
Reporters or the Utah State Bar do? If they asked Mt. Bell to 
intercept 532-1234 and give Parsons, Behle & Latimer a new 
number, what would Mt. Bell do? If Mr. Hughes complained to the 
14 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Public Service Commission, what would they do? 
The proper answer is quite apparent and well illustrated by 
Medic-Call, Inc. v. Public Service Commission 24 Utah 2d 273, 470 
p. 2d 2 5 8 ( 19 7 0) • The Defendant asserted jurisdiction over an 
answering service utilizing small portable telephone receivers 
("beepers") subscribed to by physicians. In reversing the 
Commission's finding of jurisdiction, this Court said: 
If defendants can regulate the service rendered by the 
plaintiffs herein, could they not with equal propriety 
regulate the semaphore signaling of the boy scouts or the 
smoke signals of the Indians on a hunting expedition? 
The Plaintiffs are not performing service as a public 
utility, and the defendants have no authority to regulate 
them. The order made by the Commission is set aside. 
The PSC obviously has no jurisdiction over the Capitol 
Reporters or the Utah State Bar and would leave Mr. Hughes to his 
contractual remedy, if any, just as Mt. Bell should have done in 
this case. Instead, they injected themselves into a dispute 
between subscribers, albeit caused by their own negligence, and 
willfully deprived Respondent of its telephone number without 
notice. Such intervention by the Appellant at the request of 
their St. George attorneys was a clear violation of its own 
tariff §20(E) (4), (R. 72) The owner of an independent telephone 
company testified that he would have tried to reach an agreement 
between the customers affected by such an error, but that if no 
agreement could be reached, he would do nothing, letting the 
status quo remain and rely upon . the contractual limitations of 
liability (T. 325). Had Mt. Bell done this, its liability to 
Allen, Thompson & Hughes would have been limited by the very 
cases Appellant now cites on page 36 of its brief. To illus-
15 
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trate, in the McTighe case, supra, the telephone company omitted 
the subscriber in its white pages and yellow pages. The court 
held that the liability for the white page omission was limited 
by a similar tariff, while the liability for the yellow page 
omission was limited by a provision in the advertising contract 
limiting liability for errors. The Appellant therefore had no 
exposure to Allen, Thompson & Hughes for their negligent act, yet 
they intentionally and willfully damaged Respondent by taking 
away its telephone numbers, thereby breaching the contract with 
the Atkin firm and subjecting Appellant to tort liability. 
Not only did Appellant lack a limitation of liability as to 
Respondent firm, whose "yellow page" listings were correct, but 
the evidence demonstrated bad faith (changing the number without 
notice, [T. 2 0 8] ; making a preference for its attorneys, the 
Allen firm, [T. 67]; and failure to make a good faith effort to 
ascertain that the intercepts worked properly, [T. 410-12]) and 
willful conduct that Appellant knew in advance would cause great 
damage to Respondent's firm (Exh. 7). 
III. JURY INSTRUCTIONS WERE PROPER AND WITHOUT ERROR. 
A. Appellant complains that "The Court erred in instructing 
the jury as to the existence of a contract for the telephone 
number." Instruction 5-E reads: 
When a telephone number is assigned to a subscriber and it 
is accepted by the subscriber, a contract is created by 
the telephone company and t~e subscriber. (R. 318) 
In fact, Appellant's own tariff, entitled PRIVATE LINE 
TARIFF SERVICE, 2nd Revised Page 34.1 provides: 
The term "Contract" denotes the service agreement between 
a customer and the Telephone Company under which facilities 
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for communication between specified locations for desig-
nated periods, and for the use of the customer and the 
authorized users or joint users specifically named in the 
contract are furnished in accordance with the provisions of 
this Tariff. 
This tariff embodies the instruction given by the court. 
Appellant then complains that instruction SF was improper: 
In order to find that a contract, either written or oral, 
existed between the plaintiff 'and the defendant concerning 
the use of the telephone numbers 673-4605, 673-4606, 
673-4607 and 673-4608, you must find that the defendant 
offered to let plaintiff use those numbers in consideration 
of a monthly fee and that the plaintiff accepted that offer 
and agreed to pay, in exchange therefore, a monthly fee 
for the use of those telephone numbers. (R 319). 
However, again, Appellant's own tariff, Section 20 (B) of 
General Regulations, Eleventh Revised Sheet 1, reads: 
1. Applications for establishment of telephone service 
may be made to the Telephone Company orally or in 
writing. These applications become contracts upon 
approval or establishment of the service and shall 
be subject at all times to the lawful rates and 
regulations of the Telephone Company. 
2. Requests from customers for additional service or 
equipment may be made orally or in writing and, 
upon approval or installation of the service, 
become a part of the original contract, except that 
each such additional item is subject to the 
appropriate tariff rate and initial contract 
period, if any. 
Appellant complains there was "no evidence of an oral or 
written contract for the specific numbers upon which to base 
such instructions." This is manifestly untrue. Appellant may 
not have liked the evidence, but it exists nevertheless (Exh. 6, 
the tela lease). Furthermore, J. Ralph Atkin and J. MacArthur 
Wright, testified they negotiated with Dennis Wood, Manager for 
Mt. Bell in St. George, for the retention of the numbers 
673-4606 and 673-4607 (T.382, 563), and, to get four numbers on 
a rotary basis, accepted 673-4605 and 673-4608, also Mr. Wood 
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agreed and gave the Respondent these four telephone numbers. 
In Clayton Home Equipment Company vs. Florida Telephone 
Corporation 152 So 2d 203, the court refers to contracts thusly: 
. . . that five months after said number was thus assigned 
to plaintiffs the defendant arbitrarily and without just 
cause withdrew said number and assigned a different number 
to plaintiff' telephone; that as a result of said 
breach, they suffered damages to their business and 
incurred expenses in changing the number as advertised. 
The telephone number assigned to and accepted by one who 
contracts for telephone services becomes a valuable 
business asset in the hands of the subscriber, to which he 
is entitled as a matter of contract, and he cannot be 
deprived thereof without just cause depending on the 
particular facts and circumstances in each case. Suffice 
it to say that the act of the defendant in assigning to 
plaintiffs a telephone number that had already been 
assigned to another does not constitute just cause for 
the alleged breach of contract or a proper basis on which 
to avoid the damages, if any, suffered by plaintiffs. 
In its contractual aspects the situation here is not 
unlike that where there is a mistake in the printing of a 
telephone directory, with the result that identical 
telephone numbers are shown for different subscribers. In 
Schwanke, Inc. v. Wisconsin Telephone Co., 199 Wis. 552, 
227 N.W. 30, 68 A.L.R. 1320, the court said: 
When a telephone company contracts to furnish telephone 
service, it impliedly agrees to place the subscriber's name 
and the telephone number in its directory, when that 
directory is issued in due course of business. Its failure 
to do so constitutes a breach of contract, and it is 
plainly liable upon general principles for damages 
resulting from such breach. (Emphasis Added). 
Appellant attempts to distinguish between a contract for 
services and a contract for specific telephone numbers. 
Respondent, contends there was, indeed, a contract for specific 
telephone numbers, which was breached. But also the record is 
replete with breaches, by Appellant, of its contract to provide 
reasonably adequate service. 
In Muskegon Agency v. General Telephone Company 340 Mich. 
472, 65 N.W.2d 748 the court quoted from the memorandum of the 
18 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
trial court: 
In this case, we have an agreement based upon a valid 
consideration of mutual promises. There was a breach 
of the agreement and of a duty by the defendant. . . 
It was assumed, without question, a contract existed there, 
just as one existed in the instant case. Consequently it is a 
mystery how the cited instructions can be found objectionable. 
In Point II(B) of Appellant's Brief, complaint is made that 
the Court erred in excluding portions of two instructions, SA 
and SB, submitted by Appellant, because the portions of the 
instructions given spell out the Respondent's theory of the 
case, while the excluded portions spell out the Appellant's 
theory. 
Appellant's defense, however, was effectively submitted to 
the jury in other instructions which were given to the jury. 
The excluded portions in both instructions dealt with Appel-
lant's claims that it is totally immunized by its tariffs filed 
with the PSC. Instructions 5G and SH, however, appropriately 
spell out Appellant's immunity, if any, under the tariff: 
SG - The defendant is a Public Utility under the laws of 
the State of Utah and as such is subject to the tariffs 
filed with, and approved by, the Public Service Commission. 
Tariffs are rules and regulations with which the defendant 
must comply. One such Tariff provides that the defendant 
is not liable for simple negligence in providing service, 
however·, the defendant is not immune from gross negligence 
or from willful and wanton conduct both of which are 
synonymous terms under the law. (R. 320) 
SH - A Tariff prepared by the defendant and submitted to 
and approved by the Public $ervice Commission provides that 
the subscriber has no property right in the telephone 
number however, the defendant may not arbitrarily change a 
subscribers telephone number, or exercise dominion over 
said number causing damages to a subscriber without good 
cause or a valid business reason; if it does so it is 
liable for any damage to the subscriber. (R. 321) 
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To have given these instructions together with the excluded 
portions would have been an inordinate emphasis on Appellant's 
claimed defenses. One must look at all the instructions given 
to determine whether the jury was properly instructed as Loew's, 
Inc. v. Cinema Amusements, 210 F2d 86 pointed out: 
But where the material issues in a case have been compre-
hensively and correctly covered in the general instruct-
ions, the court is not required to give requested instruct-
ions in terms to suit the desires of either party. Since 
the issues had been fairly and comprehensively covered in 
the general instructions, the refusal of the requested in-
struction did not constitute error even though they were 
correct statements of the law. 
Even if it may have been proper to have included the 
instruction, the test as stated by this Court in Ivie v. 
Richardson, 9 Utah 2d 5, 336 P.2d 781 is that: 
It is unnecessary and would serve no useful purpose for us 
to decide whether any one of the errors above discussed, 
considered separately, would constitute sufficient 
prejudicial error to require a new trial. The question is 
whether the case was presented to the jury in such. a manner 
that it is reasonable to believe there was a fair and 
impartial analysis of the evidence and a just verdict. 
The errors must be real and substantial and such as may 
reasonably be supposed would affect the result. 
In any event, the excluded portions do not accurately state 
the law, infra, Point IV. 
Subparagraph C of Appellant's Point II is only a variation 
on its Points I and III. If Appellant's position is untenable 
as to those two points, as shown by Respondent's Point IV, 
infra, then the instructions are clearly appropriate. 
IV. THE TARIFFS AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ORDER DO 
NOT PROVIDE APPELLANT A DEFENSE TO THE JURY AWARDS. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the PSC did have jurisdiction over 
the Yellow Pages advertising, or had jurisdiction to make the 
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order it entered, the Respondent should still prevail. 
Essentially, Appellant's Points I and III in its brief deal 
with the same issue, and are dealt with here together. Respon-
dent submits the issues can be succinctly stated as follows: 
A) Is the Appellant immunized from any liability by the 
Appellant's tariffs filed with the PSC? 
B) Is the Appellant immunized from liability to Respondent 
by the PSC' s order to place an intercept on the Respondent's 
numbers? 
A. In dealing with the first of these two issues, Appellant 
argues that because the PSC is granted "broad" powers to regu-
late public utilities, the entire field is pre-empted. If true, 
the courts would necessarily be divested of any jurisdiction 
insofar as Public Utilities are concerned, whether regarding 
negligence, willful misconduct, or breach of contract. 
The fact is, the PSC does not have such broad· power or 
jurisdiction, and acknowledged it did not when it said in 
paragraph 
however, 
2 of its Findings, " 
jurisdiction over civil 
(Exhibit 25 R. 129) 
.the 
liability 
court does have, 
and damages . 
Furthermore, this court enunciated that principal when, in 
granting the Appellant's extraordinary writ on February 17, 
1981, it stated, "The tort action is to continue in the district 
court." (R.217) 
Clearly, if the PSC's Order was dispositive of the issue of 
Appellant's liability, this court would not have ordered that 
the tort action be permitted to proceed. 
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The heart of Appellant's argument is that §20(E) (3) of its 
own tariff, filed with the PSC, limits its liability. That 
tariff reads: 
The Telephone Company's liability arising from errors in or 
omissions of directory listings shall be limited to and 
satisfied by a refund not exceeding the amount of the 
charges for such of the customer's service as is affected 
during the period covered by the directory in which the 
error or ornmission occurs. 
However, the very next tariff, §20(E) (4) provides: 
The Telephone Company, in accepting listings as prescribed 
by applicants or customers, will not assume responsibility 
for the result of the publication of such listings in its 
directories, nor will the Telephone Company be a party to 
controversies arising between customers or others as a 
result of such publication. (Emphasis Added). 
The Appellant originally committed a simple mistake, not in 
Respondent's listing--it was correct--but in the listing of the 
Allen firm, when it published Respondent's telephone number 
after the name of Mr. Hughes in the yellow pages of Appellant's 
directory. The incorrect number appeared only at one place--and 
at no other place where the competing firm's name appeared, 
neither in the yellow nor in the white pages! 
Upon complaint of the Allen firm, Appellant chose to become 
a party to a controversy arising between customers over that 
telephone number, in direct violation of §20(E) (4) supra. Had 
Appellant elected to remain out of that controversy, let the 
mistake stand until it could be remedied appropriately (at a 
subsequent printing of the directory--and incidently, Respondent 
offered to refer all calls meant for the competing firm to them, 
and evidence at the trial indicated that the number of such 
calls was less than one per day, (Exhibit 7) , Appellant's lia-
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bility would have been limited by §20(E) (3) if applicable, or if 
not, by its contractual limitation to the cost of the improper 
listing. 
However, Appellant chose not to follow that logical and 
legally unassailable course of action, But instead, willfully 
chose to change the long-standing numbers of the R~spondent, and 
place a mechanical intercept on the old numbers of Respondent 
and offer every caller the choice of either Respondent or the 
competing firm. 
Evidence at trial showed that in doing so, Respondent, 
among other things, lost the use of all but one of its four 
lines for incoming calls, that callers were often unable to 
obtain the new number before the mechanical intercept 
malfunctioned or automatically terminated, that some callers 
were unable to even reach the intercept message and that long 
distance callers were charged for two, calls before reaching 
Respondent's office. Later when the TRO was removed and a live 
intercept placed on the Respondent's old numbers, the record 
discloses a plethora of abuses. In addition, Appellant's 
actions directly violated §20(E) (4) supra. 
Nevertheless, Appellant seeks immunity from what the jury 
inevitably must have determined was, not merely negligence or 
breach of contract, but willful conduct not protected by its 
tarift. 
In addition to §20(E) (3), Appellant cites §20(N) (1): 
The subscriber has no property right in the telephone 
number nor any right to continuance of service through any 
particular central off ice, and the Telephone Company may 
change the telephone number or central office designation 
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of a subscriber whenever it considers it desirable in the 
conduct of its business. 
Similar tariffs ha.ve been interpreted in numerous 
jurisdictions. With respect to §20(N) (1), concerning the 
alleged right to arbitrarily take one's numbers, in Clayton, 
supra the court at 204, astutely observed, where the defendant, 
after assigning the plaintiff one number, withdrew it and 
assigned a new one, that: 
The telephone number assigned to and accepted by one who 
contracts for telephone services becomes a valuable 
business asset in the hands of the subscriber, to which he 
is entitled as a matter of contract, and he cannot be 
deprived thereof without just cause depending on the 
particular facts and circumstances in each case. Suffice 
it to say that the act of the defendant in assigning to 
plaintiffs a telephone number that had already been 
assigned to another does not constitute just cause for the 
alleged breach of contract or a proper basis on which to 
avoid the damages, if any, suffered by plaintiffs." 
(Emphasis Added). 
In this case, suffice it to say that the act of Mt. Bell in 
negligently listing Respondent's number after the name of a 
single attorney in a competing law firm's listing does not 
constitute "just cause" for breach of contract or the in-
tentional infliction of severe damages on Respondent, an 
innocent third party. The Clayton Court noted, in addition: 
In its contractual aspects the situation here is not unlike 
that where there is a mistake in the printing of a 
telephone directory, with the result that identical 
telephone numbers are shown for different subscribers. 
In Shehies. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. 382 F.2d 627, a 
case cited by the Appellant, the.telephone company relied upon a 
tariff nearly identical to § 20(N) (1) ,the Utah tariff. In 
response to the contention that the tariff conferred an unquali-
fied right upon the telephone company in respect to telephone 
24 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
numbers, the Tenth Circuit, on page 630, stated: 
This contention was rejected by the trial court and we 
think properly so. The tariff provision negatives any 
claim of a customer to a property right in a telephone 
number but cannot be construed to authorize the telephone 
company to exercise arbitrary dominion over the number so 
as to cause harm and injury to another. (Emphasis Added). 
Under a similar tariff in Price v. Southern Central Bell, 
294 Ala. 144, 313 So.2d 184 (1975), the court held that the 
telephone company could not refuse to allow the continuance of 
telephone service to a motor hotel under the same number to the 
new owner, a foreclosure sale purchaser who refused to pay the 
prior owner's past-due telephone bill. The court stated the 
telephone company's actions were clearly arbitrary and would 
cause injury to the new owner and then said, at page 188: 
... if we followed the telephone company's interpretation 
of (the ta.riff) ... changes in subscriber's numbers could be 
made at the slightest whim of the company, regardless of 
the consequences to subscribers . 
. . . The trial court's finding obviously results from an 
error of law, a construction of the applicable tariffs 
which places an unlimited discretion in the telephone 
company to deal with its telephone numbers as it pleases 
and to change a new subscriber's number solely because a 
new subscriber refuses to pay an old subscriber's past-due 
bill. (Emphasis Added). 
Another reason why the limitation in the tariff is 
inapplicable here is that the tariff applies only "in the 
conduct of its business." In the Muskegon case, supra, the 
court considered Appellant's contentions in relation to a tariff 
almost identical to the Utah tariff. In ruling, the court used 
the following language from the trial court's opinion (J?age 
7 51) : 
The change in the number and the kind of service extended 
to the plaintiff by the defendant after June 1, 1950, was 
not occasioned by the 'exigencies of the business' , but 
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rather, by the negligence of the defendant's agents. 
c:. Therefore, again assuming the reasonableness of the rule, 
the rule would be inapplicable to the instant case. 
(Emphasis Added) . 
Here, as there, the number change was not occasioned by the 
"exigencies of the business" or the "conduct of its busine~;s", 
but by the negligence or error of Appellant. 
Continuing the above quote at pages 751-52 it states: 
Reasonable application of the rule does not give the 
Company an unqualified right to change or cancel telephtme 
numbers at any time. The rule gives the Company the 
privilege of changing numbers 'whenever exigencies of the 
business so require. ' It would be an unreasonable inter-
pretation and application of the rule to hold that the 
Company could change numbers without liability for damages 
whenever the Company is guilty of negligence, either gross 
or ordinary. Such an interpretation and application would 
open the door to great abuse. A rule of this kind ought to 
be strictly construed. (Emphasis Added). 
Concerning tariff §20(E) (3), the cases also hold that the 
limitation of that tariff did not apply to conduct which is 
willful or wanton in nature. For example, Southern Bell 
Telephone Company v. Invenchek, Inc., 204 S.E.2d 457 held: 
Count 3 alleges that the interruptions of telephone 
service, delays, and disconnections of plaintiff's 
telephone were the result of wilful misconduct on the part 
of the defendant. Here the tariff quoted above has no 
application and constitutes no defense as against this 
count, and the grant of the motion to strike was to this 
extent accurate. (Emphasis Added). 
Vails vs. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 504 F. 
Supp. 740, after citing cases that have upheld 
tariff limitations in mere negligence situations, the court 
said: 
The above cited cases held essentially that a 
telephone company could limit its liability for negligent 
omission or errors in directory advertising so long as it 
does not seek immunity from gross negligence or wilful 
misconduct. (Emphasis Added)\ 
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Pilot, supra, at page 362, after discussing at length 
-the legality of tariffs limiting liability for such things as 
service interruptions, stated: 
This court is likewise convinced that the tariff 
with the South Carolina Public Service Commission 
Federal Communication Commission effectively 
defendant's liability for service interruption 
absence of its gross negligence or wilful/wanton 
(Emphasis Added). 
on file 
and the 
limits 
in the 
conduct. 
Concerning the issue of what is gross negligence, or 
willful or wanton conduct, (often the terms are used 
interchangeably in the cases) , the Pilot case, supra, on page 
362, defined the terms as follows: 
Gross negligence is the intentional conscious failure to do 
a thing that is encumbent [sic] upon one to do, or the 
doing of a thing intentionally that one ought not to do. 
Certainly, whether the Appellant's conduct falls into that 
category or not is a jury question, and the jury evidently 
determined that Appellant's acts were indeed willful. Su ff ice 
it to say the Appellant did, with full knowledge of the circum-
stances, elect to take the side of one customer, (its attorneys) 
whose listing was "botched" by Appellant, against another 
customer, the Respondent, whose listing was proper, and take 
Respondent's telephone numbers from it, substitute new ones 
and put an ineffective intercept mechanism on the old numbers. 
The jury could have decided nothing else but that the acts of 
the Appellant were the "doing of a thing intentionally that one 
ought not to do." Pilot, supra. 
B. Concerning the second point, whether the Appellant is 
immunized from any liability to Respondent by the Order of the 
PSC, is dependent on, among other things, the fact that the 
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c . 
Appellant committed the act that made the order necessary. As 
. _the trial judge observed at one point, if a Defendant causes one 
to get cancer, that chemotherapy is ordered rather than surgery, 
does not release Defendant's liability for the initial wrong. 
The order was made because of the initial negligence of the 
Appellant. Furthermore, Appellant's subsequent wrongful act in 
injecting itself into a situation is forbidden by its own 
tariff, §20 (E) ( 4) , supra. That is also the reason that the 
Sokol v. Public Utilities Commission, 418 P.2d 265 is not 
apropos to this case as the Appellant contends. There, the 
telephone company was informed by the San Francisco Police Chief 
that he thought the Plaintiff's telephones were being used for 
an illegal purpose (a bookie operation). Pursuant to a pre-
existing order of the Public Utilities Commission, the Telephone 
Company thereupon disconnected the telephone lines of the 
Plaintiff. 
Upon being sued by the Plaintiff, the court held the tele-
phone company could not be held liable for complying with a 
tariff that required, upon notification by a law enforcement 
official that the lines were being used for a criminal purpose, 
the telephone lines be disconnected. 
There was no suggestion that the order, with which the 
telephone company complied, was made necessary, by the act of 
the telephone company whether negligent or not. 
This court recognized that principal when it specifically 
authorized the tort action for damages in the District Court to 
proceed (R. 216). 
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Though, after much research, Respondent has found few cases 
-dealing specifically with a similar fact situation, analogies 
can be drawn. In 17 Am. Jur. 2d 875, Contracts §419, it states: 
Moreover, impossibility of performance which comes 
about through a default of the contracting party under the 
duty of performing is not excused where, through his 
failure to carry out his obligations, a governmental 
prohibition becomes applicable to and prevents performance 
of the contract. (Emphasis adaed) 
In Williston on Contracts, §1939, stating generally that 
one is protected if he was powerless to prevent or control the 
governmental order, says: 
if so, he will be discharged, provided the judicial 
decree or proceeding was not generated by defendants own 
act or fa u 1 t . ( Emphasis Added) . 
Williston suggests the act bringing about the judicial decree or 
order need not even be I".egligent or wrongful, just that the 
judicial order was brought about by the Defendant's own act! 
In the instant situation, though not precisely a contract 
dispute, the order of the PSC came about only because of 
Appellant's own fault--its own wrong doing, or at the very 
least, its own act. 
In McAleer v. American Telephone Company, 416 F. Supp. 435, 
the above rationale that one can not hide behind a judicial 
decree when it was brought about by one's own act or wrong was 
well illustrated when an employee and a union brought an action 
under the Civil Rights Act alleging that the employee was denied 
promotion in favor of a less qualified, less senior female 
employee who allegedly received the promotion solely because of 
her sex. Plaintiff alleged that he was denied the promotion to 
which he was entitled under the provisions of a collective 
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bargaining agreement. The defendant justified its conduct by 
pointing to a consent judgment containing an affirmative action 
program which obligated it to favor women, regardless of 
seniority, in order to eliminate past sex discrimination. The 
central legal issue was whether the consent judgment provided 
defendant with a complete defense to plaintiff's claims, or 
whether, in spite of its conceded reliance on the consent 
judgment, defendant was required to respond in damages. It was 
true that defendant was following the consent decree, and 
ordinarily one who acts pursuant to a judicial order or other 
lawful process has been protected from liability arising from 
the act. But the court held such protection did not exist where 
the judicial order was nec~ssitated by the wrongful conduct of 
the party sought to have been held liable. The consent decree 
on which the defendant relied was necessary because of 
defendant's prior sex discrimination. Under these circumstances 
the decree provided no defense against the claims of a faultless 
employee such as plaintiff. The court held that plaintiff had a 
cause of action for monetary damages under the Civil Rights Act. 
The analogy in that case is remarkable in its similarity to 
the instant case. Respondent was faultless and the PSC's Order 
was made necessary by the Appellant's prior act or wrongful 
conduct. 
In Savage vs. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 432 P.2d 519 the 
issue of supervening impossibility was raised by Plaintiff when 
it agreed it could not complete a contract as originally contem-
plated because of an injunction against it to prevent damage to 
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a surrounding business. The court reasoned, page 5 2 2 , and the 
rationale is analogous to the instant case: 
He (the plaintiff) was eventually able to complete his 
promised sandblasting (in spite of the injunction), but to 
do so he had to spend more money than he had planned on 
SJ?ei;.ding. to ~rotect thi:d persons. The alleged impossi-
bility in this case arises out of increased expense in 
complying with court orders. 
In the current case, Appellant is merely faced with the 
same dilemma in complying with the PSC's Order, that is, paying 
the increased cost, i.e., the damages for the injury it caused 
to Respondent. A Utah case, Castagna v. Church 552 P2d 1282, 
reasoned along the same lines. 
The Appellant here should surely have recognized that, if 
it made an error in its directory and then, more importantly, 
took a course of action that would reasonably damage someone, it 
would be subjected to extra costs or charges. 
It should be further noted that to adopt Appellant's 
theory, its defense would have the illogical effect of circum-
venting the principal that the PSC has no jurisdiction to 
adjudicate tort or damage actions--even against public 
utilities. Even the PSC acknowledged it does not have that 
authority in the very order that is at issue here. Yet, if that 
order can be construed to immunize the Appellant from liability 
for its willful acts, the PSC has adjudicated a tort or damage 
action as surely as if it had held a full blown trial, 
deliberated over the evidence and found the Appellant not 
liable! 
The Muskegon case, supra, page 753, stated: 
It is axiomatic that an administrative agency, vested with 
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quasi-judicial as well as quasi-legislative powers, can act 
1;·. upon complaints properly filed and accord a hearing to all 
parties. The jurisdiction of the public service commission 
under the statutory provisions is broad and comprehensive. 
Yet that jurisdiction has generally been prospective in 
operation. However, it is not a proper tribunal to decide 
a controversy after damage has been inflicted. This is a 
civil action to recover damages for breach of contract or 
for negligence. The commission has no jurisdiction to 
award plaintiff damages or to reimburse plaintiff for its 
losses. Only a court, in accordance with due process, can 
constitutionally award damages' in a civil action. 
The fallibility of Appellant's position (that it is pro-
tected by the Commission's Order) is further demonstrated by 
Product Research Associates v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph 
Company 16 Cal App. 3rd 651, 94 Cal. Rptr. 216. In that case, 
Plaintiff sued Defendant for loss of telephone service which it 
contended resulted in the loss of a distributorship of a 
Japanese product. The Defendant contended it was protected by a 
tariff limiting its liability to a credit for interrupted 
service not to exceed the amount of the total charges for the 
service. 
The Court of Appeals prefaced its opinion in reversing the 
Superior Court that had granted summary judgment for the 
telephone company, by saying: 
We observe, initially, that the Commission does not have 
exclusive jurisdiction over any and all matters having any 
reference to the regulation and supervision of public 
utilities (quoting case). Thus under Public Utilitiy 
Code, Section 2106 [which is virtually identical to 
§54-7-22, UCA] the courts of this state are expressly 
granted jurisdiction to award both compensatory and (in a 
proper case) exemplary damages against a public utility for 
a loss, damage or injury resulting from any unlawful act or 
omission to perform a required act. 
The PSC should not be permitted to do by circumvention, 
i.e., by issuing an order, what it cannot do directly, i.e. 
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determine a damage issue. 
V. SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT EVIDENCE, THE BEST R.EASONABLY 
OBTAINABLE, ESTABLISHED RESPONDENT'S LOSS BY THE MOST ACCURATE 
BASIS POSSIBLE. 
The exact damages inflicted upon Respondent by 
Appellant are impossible to ascertain. When four telephone 
lines are taken with virtually nc;> notice, when a mechanical 
intercept fails to function, when a live intercept is plagued 
with problems, incorrect responses and rudeness, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, for Respondent to find those 
prospective clients who attempted to contact Respondent but 
failed or gave up. Several established clients testified about 
the various difficulties they encountered in telephoning Respon-
dent (T. 122, 278, 291, 297), including some who took business 
elsewhere or took care of their problem personally because of 
the telephone problems (T. 292). Accounting records and ex-
penses made necessary by the change in numbers, charts depicting 
the decline in expected revenue, and a chart showing the drastic 
reduction in telephone calls received were all presented and 
explained in detail by testimony to the jury (Exh. 22, 23, 27, 
28, 29, 30, 31, 32 & 33). For example, the charts on income 
showed, for the fourth quarter of 1980, a $11,105 drop in 
anticipated income, based on the prior year's income and the 
growth in volume Respondent firm was experiencing (Exh. 27). 
The data for 1981 showed a nearly normal first quarter. This 
was mainly before the restraining order was lifted and the live 
intercept installed. After the intercept, Respondent suffered a 
severe drop in the second and third quarters before stabilizing 
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!II 
somewhat in the fourth quarter, when a correct telephone book 
came out. The total decline in expected revenues for the year 
1981 was $29,532. Added to the $11,105, the total loss would be 
$ 4 0 , 6 3 7 ( Exh . 2 7) • 
Dr. Simmons, an expert witness, testified that such a 
disruption would have a very serious and adverse impact upon 
callers, causing many of them to go elsewhere (T. 138-158). Mr. 
Hughes, Appellant's own witness, testified that a correct yellow 
page listing was worth approximately $3, 000. 00 per month in 
additional revenues for his firm, a firm of similar size to 
Respondent's in St. George (T. 712). A year at that rate would 
support a judgment of $36,000. 
The jury verdict of $25, 000. 00 appears to be well within 
the parameters of the evidence presented and should not be 
modified on appeal simply because the actual damages sustained 
cannot be proved with mathematical precision. Appellant's own 
witness said the loss of one good case could cause $100,000 in 
damages (T. 711). 
In Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Reeves (1979, Tex Civ App 
1st Dist) 578 SW2d 795, a judgment of $10, 000 in lost profits 
for an attorney where the telephone company failed to intercept 
calls to an old number and refer callers to the new number was 
upheld al though the exact amount of damage was incapable of 
ascertainment. Accord, B & W _Rustproofing, Inc. v. Michigan 
Bell Tel. Co. (1979) 88 Mich App 242, 276 NW2d 572. 
In Muskegon, Agency, Inc. v. General Telephone Company 350 
Mich. 41, 85 N. W. 2d 1 70, the Michigan Supreme Court, having 
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previously remanded the case for trial (Muskegon, supra) saying 
tariffs like those Appellant relies on here were no defense, 
affirmed an award of $16, 000 damages for lost business to the 
Plaintiff subscriber, an insurance agency. Plaintiff sought 
rotary service to accomodate its increased business and was 
given new numbers with the change-over to coincide with the 
issuance of ·the next directory. Immediately after the change 
Plaintiff learned that the new number assigned was already in 
use by a local bank. The phone company gave Plaintiff its old 
number back, meaning Plaintiff was disconnected from its listed 
number from June 6, 1950 to June 1, 1951, a year, just as 
Respondent was. The phone company arranged for the bank to 
refer callers seeking Plaintiff to the old number. This 
solution, much like the live intercept in this case, proved to 
be inadequate. Plaintiff presented evidence at trial estimating 
the loss of new business and renewal business normally expected 
on new clients. The court conceded the proof of damages was 
subject to doubt, but refused to find the damages speculative or 
conjectural. The Court quoted Allison v. Chandler 11 Mich. 542, 
a well-reasoned and extensively quoted case, wherein it is 
stated: 
Since, from the nature of the case, the damages cannot be 
estimated with certainty, and there is a risk of giving by 
one course of trial less, and by the other more than a fair 
compensation--to say nothing of justice--does not sound 
policy require that the r.;i.sk should be thrown upon the 
wrong doer instead of the injured party? . But shall 
the injured party in an action of tort, which may happen to 
furnish no element of certainty, be allowed to recover no 
damages (or merely nominal) , because he can not show the 
exact amount with certainty, though he is ready to show, to 
the satisfaction of the jury, that he has suffered large 
damages by the injury? Certainty, it is true, would thus 
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be attained; but it would be the certainty of injustice. 
The law does not require impossibilities; and can not 
therefore require a higher degree of certainty than the 
nature of the case admits. . Juries are allowed to act 
upon probable and inferential, as well as direct and 
positive proof. And when, from the nature of the case, the 
amount of the damages can not be estimated with certainty, 
or only a part of them can be so estimated, we can see no 
objection to placing before the jury all the facts and 
circumstances of the case, having any tendency to show 
damages, or their probable amount; so as to enable them to 
make the most intelligible and probable estimate which the 
nature of the case will permit. (Emphasis added) 
This last part was quoted with approval in Gould v. 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company, 6 Utah 2d 187, 
309 P.2d 802 (1957), where the Plaintiff attorney was negli-
gently omitted from the classified section or "yellow pages" and 
brought action for loss of past and future profits. The Utah 
Court therein distinguished the cases relied upon by Appellants. 
After setting forth the facts of those cases, this Court said: 
It will be noted that both cases are readily distinguish-
able from the instant case in that in both cases Plaintiff 
introduced no evidence to show any causal relation between 
loss of profits and th~ error in the directory, whereas in 
the instant case Plaintiff has shown that he lost some 
referral matters. Where the plaintiff has shown actual 
loss of business during the period as a result of defen-
dant's breach of contract, he will not be denied recovery 
because the exact amount of damage cannot be readily 
ascertained. To this effect is the rule laid down by this 
court that where the fact of substantial damage is shown, 
the court or jury cannot award nominal damages only on the 
ground that the amount of substantial damage has not been 
shown with reasonable certainty. 
The rule against recovery of uncertain damages is 
generally directed against uncertainty with respect to 
cause rather than to measure or extent, so that a party who 
has broken his contract will not ordinarily be permitted to 
escape liability because of uncertainty in amount of damage 
resulting, and the fact that the full extent of damages for 
breach of contract roust be a matter of speculation is not a 
ground for refusing all damages. 
Respondents produced evidence of much lost business, such 
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as the testimony of Richard Hunter, who, due to his invalid 
condition and inability to reach Mr. Miles by phone, performed 
the legal work himself (T. 287-294). 
The Gould case then quoted from Sommerville v. Chesapeake & 
P. Telephone Co. (49 App D.C. 3), 258 F. 147 as follows: 
'* * * But * * * it does not seem reasonable that in these 
days, when a telephone is an indispensable adjunct to every 
line of business, the inevitable inconvenience, annoyance, 
and loss of time caused to a subscriber by the wrongful 
action of the company in cutting off his service without 
notice should not be regarded as a proper subject for 
compensatory damages. To prove that one lost a certain 
number of dollars by reason of the company's action might 
be very difficult, and yet, we think, all reasonable men 
would say that he was injured thereby. * * *" (emphasis 
original) 
In Registered Physical Therapists, Inc. vs. Jepson 584 P.2d 
857 (1978), this Court said: 
. where damages are attributable to the wrong of the 
defendant and are only uncertain as to amount, they will 
not be denied even though they are difficult of 
ascertainment. 
Appellant argue that Respondent's proof regarding loss of 
income, that is, of gross receipts, is fatally defective because 
proof of net profits lost is required. Appellant knew as early 
as May 11, 1981, several months prior to trial, that the proof 
would be restricted to gross income lost and Appellant should be 
estopped to raise this point for the first time on appeal. 
At the Pre-Trial hearing held May 11, 1981 the subject of 
Respondent's federal income tax returns, which had previously 
been obtained by Appellant through discovery, was discussed. 
most of the tax deductions reported on the federal tax return 
were not affected by Appellant's actions. For example, the 
deductions claimed for building and equipment depreciation, 
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utilities, insurance, secretarial salaries, payroll taxes, 
repairs to building and equipment, rent, dues and licenses, and 
interest paid on building and equipment loans were fixed and 
constant expenses, regardless of the volume of business. Only 
if business greatly increased, requiring expansion, or greatly 
decreased, requiring closure of the business, would these fixed 
expenses vary appreciably. Very few expenses of a law firm vary 
in proportion to the volume of business. Only the gross 
receipts of Respondent was substantially affected by Appellant's 
wrongful actions. 
The Court thereupon ordered, at the May 11, 1981 Pre-Trial, 
and with the actual stipulation of Appellant's counsel 
(Pre-Trial Conference P. 27), that the Respondent's tax returns 
could not be presented to the jury. Appellant now contends that 
only net profits rather than gross receipts can be credible 
evidence of damages, but Appellant, having so stipulated has 
waived the right to complain on this issue. 
In Security Development Company v. Fedco, Inc. 23 Utah 2d 
306, 462 P.2d 700 (1969) this court recognized that evidence of 
decline in gross receipts was sufficient to support a jury 
verdict when it stated: 
There was testimony of experts to the effect that net 
profits are directly related to gross profits which in turn 
are directly related to gross sales. The jury, therefore, 
had evidence of a proper basis from which it could have 
determined that plaintiff's.business was adversely affected 
by the deprivation of floor space. Damages are not to be 
denied simply because they cannot be ascertained with 
exactness. If a reasonable basis of calculation is 
afforded, it is sufficient al though the result is only 
approximate. Since gross sales declined rather 
regularly with reduction in floor space, and since sales 
were made to a membership of clients which was increasing 
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as time went on, the jury could find that the reduction in 
the amount of sales was directly related to the reduction 
in floor space given to the plaintiff. 
In making its decision, the Utah Court quoted Lavender v. 
Kurn 3 2 7 U . S . 6 4 5 , 6 5 3 , 6 6 S . Ct . 7 4 0 , 7 4 4 , 9 0 L . Ed . 916 ( 19 4 5) 
as follows: 
It is no answer to say that the jury's verdict involved 
speculation and conjecture. Whenever facts are in dispute 
or the evidence is such that fair minded men may draw 
different inferences, a measure of speculation and conjec-
ture is required on th~ part of those whose duty it is to 
settle the dispute by choosing what seems to them to be the 
most reasonable inference. . Where, as here, there is 
an evidentiary basis for the jury's verdict, the jury is 
free to discard or disbelieve whatever facts are inconsis-
tent with its conclusion. And the appellate court's 
function is exhausted when that evidentiary basis becomes 
apparent, it being immaterial that the court might draw a 
contrary inference or feel that another conclusion is more 
reasonable. 
Respondent produced at trial the best evidence reasonably 
obtainable. Most expense items were unaffected by the Appel-
lant' s action, being "fixed expenses". Subtraction of these 
expenses from gross income to obtain net income would not 
materially assist the jury and could lead to confusion over 
expenses not relevant to the case. 
To show loss of income the claimant must establish his loss 
"by the most accurate basis possible under the circumstances. 
He must produce the best evidence reasonably obtainable." 
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Hinchcliffe (10th 
Cir. 1953) 204 F. 2d 381. In this case the tenth circuit noted 
that the telephone company, as here, did not challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence at trial or after the verdict. The 
Court then said: 
Hinchcliffe introduced other evidence in support of his 
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claim of loss of profits, which we think measured up to the 
requirement that the plaintiff must produce the best 
evidence reasonably available. 
The Court then made reference to the "other evidence," 
which included evidence of gross receipts and difficulty in 
getting through to his office, the same type of evidence abun-
dantly produced by Respondent in this case. Unlike Garcia v. 
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. (10th Cir. 1963) 315 
F. 2d 166, relied upon by Appellant, Respondent in this case 
showed that the decrease in gross income was directly related to 
the wrongful actions of Appellant by introducing evidence of a 
sharp decline in incoming calls, several clients who testified 
they had difficulty and would have taken their business else-
where had they been calling for the first time, and the expert 
testimony of Dr. Simmons showing that new clients, calling on 
the recommendation of a friend or from the yellow pages, would 
quickly call another lawyer upon experiencing the difficulty 
frequently encountered by callers attempting to reach Respond-
ent. 
case: 
Winsness, supra, states the rule that should govern this 
Where there is strong evidence of the fact of damage, a 
defendant should not escape liability because the amount of 
damage ~annot be proved with precision. 
In Prince v. Peterson (Utah, 1975) 538 P.2d 1325 this court 
stated: 
We frequently declare our commitment to the jury system, 
under which it is the prerogative of lay citizens to 
determine questions of fact, both as to liability and the 
fixing of damages; and in cases of this character their 
varied experiences and their closeness to the reality of 
everyday affairs qualify them to fix damages as well as or 
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perhaps better than judges. The court should give the jury 
system more than lip service, by honoring the jury's prero-
gatives; and by declining to interfere therewith unless the 
determinations made are entirely without foundation in 
evidence, or are so fragmentary and unsubstantial that no 
reasonable minds acting fairly on the evidence could have 
so concluded. In addition to what has been said concerning 
the fact that the jury seems to have sensed what had 
occurred and to have done justice concerning it, the trial 
court also indicated his approval by refusing to interfere 
with the verdict or to grant a, new trial. 
The jury's verdict, on the evidence presented, could have 
been more than $40,000.00. The $25,000.00 awarded is well 
within the evidence presented and should not be disturbed on 
appeal. 
VI. PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE APPROPRIATE 
In disputing the punitive damage award, Appellant lists 
three subheadings. The first point is that Appellants acts were 
not wrongful. 
UCA 54-7-22 sets the paramaters for both an award of 
damages and for an award of exemplary or punitive damages with 
respect to Public Utilities: 
54-7-22. DELICT OF UTILITIES--CIVIL LIABILITY--(!) In 
case any public utility shall do or cause or permit to Ee 
done any act, matter or thing prohibited, forbidden or 
declared to be unlawful, or shall omit to do any act, 
matter or thing required to be done, either by the 
Constitution or any law of this state or by any order or 
decision of the commission, such public utility shall be 
liable to the persons ~ffected thereby for all loss, 
damages or injury caused thereby or resulting therefrom, 
and if the court shall find that the act or omission was 
willful, the court shall, in addition to the actual 
damages, award exemplary damages. An action to recover for 
such loss, damage or injury may be brought in any court of 
competent jurisdiction by any person. (Emphasis added) 
To mention only the obvious, Appellant violated its tariff, 
§20, (E) (4), supra, by interjecting itself into a controversy 
between customers. 
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The Appellant failed to comply with UCA 54-3-1 which among 
other things requires of a Public Utility that it: 
. . . shall furnish, provide and maintain such service 
instrumentalities, equipment and facilities as will promote 
the safety, health, comfort and convenience of its patrons, 
employees and the public, and as will be in all respects 
adequate, efficient, just and reasonable. (Emphasis added) 
"Shall" is mandatory, not disc.retionary. 
Section UCA 54-3-8 provides in part: 
No public utility shall, as to rates, charges, service, 
facilities or in any other respect, make or grant any 
preference or advantage to any person, or subject any 
~p_e_r_s_o_n~-t~o~_a_n~y~Ap_r_e~J~·u~d_i_c_e~_o_r~_d_1_·s~a_d_v_a_n_t_a--"'-g_e. (Emphasis 
added) 
Appellant violated that mandatory directive when it elected 
to grant a preference to the Allen firm, its attorney, and take 
Respondent's especially contracted for numbers from it. The 
record, is replete with other abuses by Appellant. 
Appellant's second point, that its acts were not willful 
and malicious, is contradicted by UCA 54-7-22 which only 
requires "willful" and not "malicious". In any event, willful 
conduct or gross negligence is generally defined as "inten-
tional," "conscious," "indifference," or "conscious of it (the 
act) as an invasion of the Plaintiff's rights" etc., Pilot, 
supra. .. 
Appellant's third point is that Respondent suffered no 
actual damage, which is a rather remarkeable conclusion in view 
of the jury verdict for $25,000 .compensatory damages based upon 
the evidence and the law heretofore discussed. 
In discussing punitive damages, the facts as spelled out 
heretofore need not be repeated but should be remembered. 
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Against the backdrop of those facts, the Respondent cites the 
following cases: 
The Appellant referred to Waters vs. Pacific Telephone 
Company 528 P.2d 1161 in support of the proposition that it is 
protected by the tariff. However, that case was careful to 
couch its decision on the predicate that there was only 
"ordinary negligence" involved. Respondent contends, and the 
jury agreed, the instant case goes beyond ordinary negligence. 
The dissent in the Waters case, arguing that the utility 
should have been denied the tariff protection even for the 
ordinary negligence, makes some valid observations that cer-
tainly do apply to conduct beyond ordinary negligence, even if 
they don't apply to simple negligence. In referring to a 
California statute, which is virtually identical to UCA 54-3-1, 
supra, Justice Mask noted: 
. section 451 which in relevant part, asserts: 'Every 
public utility shall furnish and maintain such adequate, 
efficient, just, and reasonable service, instrumentalities, 
equipment, and f acili t-ies as are necessary to promote the 
safety, heal th, comfort, and convenience of -its patrons, 
employees, and the public.' 
Section 451 is a statutory command that the telephone 
company 'shall furnish 'adequate' service to its patrons. 
Failure to do so violates the statute and is unlawful. It 
expresses the public policy of this state that public 
utilities without the customary competitive business 
incentives, shall be held to a high standard of performance 
in the ~ervice they have undertaken to render. 
It is, important to note that monopolies, without the need 
to compete for business, require $Orne incentive to encourage them 
to deliver a reasonable standard of service. 
The Appellant cited Elkington vs. Faust 618 P.2d 37, to 
support its argument that willful and malicious acts are 
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necessary to support punitive damages, ignoring, the impact of 
UCA 54-7-22. The Elkington case actually sustained an award of 
$30,000 punitive damages on top of compensatory damages of only 
$12,000, noting, page 41, that the . "ratio is not too far 
apart from the penalty provisions in some civil matters for 
certain violations of statutory proh~bitions ... ",and added: 
... They (punitive damages) are allowed as a punishment to 
the offender, and as a warning to him, and to others, not to 
engage in similar vexatious actions. • When such facts 
are found to exist, the amount of such award is left to the 
sound judgment of the jury as related to the circumstances 
of the individual case. 
In the instant case, the compensatory damages were 
$25,000 and the exemplary only $30,000, much less than the ratio 
of almost 3 to 1 allowed in the Elkington case. 
This court, in First Security Bank Of Utah vs. JBJ 
Feedya.rds, Inc., (case No. 17269 & 17270 filed July 20, 1982) 
discussed in detail punitive damages, and though reducing 
punitives from $100,000 to $50,000 on approximately $34,000 in 
compensatory damages, the court provided guidelines for awarding 
punitive damages: 
In determining the amount of such damages, the fact finder 
should consider the following factors: (1) the nature of the 
alleged misconduct of the defendant, ( 2) the extent of the 
effect of the misconduct on the lives of the plaintiff and 
others, ( 3) the probability of future recurrence of such 
misconduct, ( 4) the relationship between the parties, ( 5) 
the re la ti ve weal th of the defendant, ( 6) the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the misconduct, (7) and the amount 
of actual damages awarded. 
The Respondent believes, from the record and from the award, 
the jury followed those guidelines and that the award is 
reasonable. 
This court in Terry vs. Zions Co-Op Mercantile Institution 
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605 P.2d 314, restored punitive damages to the amount awarded by 
the jury, $15,000.00, after the trial court had remitted them to 
$2,000.00. The court observed, page 328: 
Due to the purposes underlying the award of punitive damages 
many factors contribute in determining their appropriate 
measure. While the amount of compensatory damages awarded 
is one such factor, it is not the exclusive one. The jury 
in its original decision or the court in its review of that 
decision must also consider the particular nature of the 
defendant's acts, the probability of those acts being 
repeated in the future, and the relative weal th of the 
particular defendant. 
In the instant case, the jury made a finding and an award of 
punitive damages very close to the compensatory award. Evidence 
showed the Appellant to have a net worth of $2,873,600,000, (Exh. 
26 page 7) . The trial judge was neither asked, nor did he, on 
his own, remit any amount of the punitive award. On the 
contrary, he commended the j~ry for a job well done (T. 784). 
Of significance is the comment made by Mr. Justice Hall in 
the concurring and dissenting opinion in the Terry case supra: 
The trial judge was in a unique position which afforded him 
the opportunity to observe the matter first hand and to 
sense the events and personalities involved and thus to 
guard against an award of punitive damages reflective of 
passion or animus. His determination that the damages in 
question must bear some reasonable relationship to the 
injury and actual damages suffered is in accord with ·the 
general rule of law on the subject. 
Though, in that instance, the trial judge had attempted to 
remit a portion of the punitive damages, the philosophy of the 
above quotation is appropriate. Both the jury and the trial 
judge are in a unique position to observe the matter first hand. 
And when, as here, their judgments apparently agree and the 
punitive damages bear a reasonable relationship to the com-
pensatory, those collective judgments--the jury' s--and the 
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judge's should stand. 
In Clayton vs. Crossroads Equipment Company/ et al, -- (Case 
No. 17013, filed Sept. 17, 1982) this court found a wrongful 
attachment and pointed out: 
It is well established in the jurisprudence of this state 
that punitive damages may be awarded when the proof supports 
a finding that the defendant's conduct was wilful or 
malicious. (emphasis added) 
In explaining that the court further, stated: 
. such gross neglect of duty as to evince a reckless 
indifference of the rights of others on the part of the 
wrongdoer, and an entire want of care so as to raise the 
presumption that the person at fault is conscious of the 
consequences of his carelessness. 
The attitude of agents of the Appellant, and the cavalier 
manner in which the Appellant imposed the damage which the jury 
found to have been inflicted, represented "reckless indifference 
of the rights of others." Certainly Appellant was conscious of 
the consequences of its carelessness. 
Another case decided by this court is Nash vs. Craigco, Inc. 
(1978) 585 P.2d 775. The defendant breached a f idiciary duty 
owed to his co-stockholder in the issuance of stock in the 
corporation. The Court observed, page 776, that: 
We have reviewed the evidence and find that reasonable minds 
could differ in deciding whether defendant acted wilfully 
and maliciously in issuing the 14,700 shares of stock, and 
whether he did so with the intent to injure the plaintiff .. 
. . As to punitive damages in this case, it appears that the 
question was one for the jury to decide. 
Whether willful, as used in UCA 54-7-22, means malice-in-se, 
or only malice-in-law, Sommers vs. Mountain States Telephone & 
Telegraph Company 519 P. 2d 874, (1974), held: 
The trial court found Mountain Bell breached its agreement 
with the plaintiff to provide intercept service until new 
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directories had been issued, and that this breach was the 
result of a deliberate business decision on the part of the 
company. 
The trial court further found that although discontinu-
ance of the intercept service was "wilful" in the sense that 
it was deliberately and knowingly done, it was not a wilful 
act in the sense that it was done with malice or with a 
primary intent to injure the plaintiff .... 
Plaintiff has appealed the judgment insofar as it 
determined the existence of a limitation on liability and 
limited damages to the sum of $65.00. 
The sole question presented by this appeal is whether the 
exculpatory clause within the tariff precludes lfability for 
"willful and deliberate" acts unless a customer can show 
malice or intent to injure him. (Emphasis added) 
Though this case was dealing primarily with the tariff 
limitation, its definition of willful is applicable as well to 
the issue of punitive damages for willful conduct as provided in 
UCA 54-7-22. The court found: 
if we accept Mountain Bell's contention that malice 
or intent to injure is necessary, (the result) would be that 
it would escape liability for acts done under authorization 
of other tariffs even if done with malicious intent to 
injure the other contracting parties. We do not believe 
this to be the intent of the tariff provision. 
Webster's New World Dictionary defines wilful as "done 
deliberately or intentionally". Deliberate is defined as 
"carefully thought out or formed; premeditated; done on 
purpose". Nowhere in these definitions do we find an 
implication of malice. The words employed in a contract and 
the purpose of the writing must be ascertained from their 
common sense meaning as a whole .... 
We find that even if a requirement of malice can be read 
into the tariff, the plaintiff is still entitled to recover. 
Malice has been defined by our Supreme Court as the 
"intentional doing of a wrongful act without legal 
justification or excuse, or . . the wilful violation of a 
known right . . Malice in the sense of ill will or spite 
not being essential.' 
Respondent submits, then, that not only were the punitive 
damages appropriate, but the amount was also proper. 
VII RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Appellant, in its Point IV (A), claim Respondent's loss was 
an impermissible claim for attorney's fees. Appellant's theory 
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is that the revenue dropped off because the attorneys in 
Respondent firm were spending time on this case. The jury 
obviously didn't accept Appellant's theory. Evidence at trial 
showed that the attorneys had to make up time by working weekends 
and evenings (T. 542-43). 
More importantly, the trial court erred when it refused to 
give Respondent's proposed Instructions No. 2 and 8 relating to 
attorney's fees for breach of contract, or as an element of 
damages, or for successfully resisting Appellant's motion to this 
Court for a Writ Of Prohibition (R. 171, 193-95). An exception 
was taken (T.779-80). 
Exh. 6, the tela lease contract, paragraph 23, provides for 
attorney's fees upon default. In addition, 78-27-56, UCA, would 
allow attorney's fees if Appellant did not act in good faith. 
Another basis for attorney's fees is as " ... a legitimate item 
of damage resulting from a wrongful act." (Capson v. Brisbois 
(Utah, 1979) 592 P.2d 583). A final basis for attorneys fees is 
47 uses §206, which provides: 
In case any common carrier shall do, or cause or permit to 
be done, any act, matter, or thing in this Act prohibited or 
declared to be unlawful, or shall omit to do ·any act, 
matter, or thing in this Act required to be done, such 
common carrier shall be liable to the person or persons 
injured thereby for the full amount of damages sustained in 
consequence of any such violation of the provisions of this 
Act, together with a reasonable counsel or attorney's feee, 
to be fixed by the court in every case of recovery, which 
attorney's fee shall be taxed and collected as part of the 
costs in the case. (Emphasis.added) 
CONCLUSION 
The unanimous jury verdict should be affirmed as to the 
award of compensatory and punitive damages and remanded to the 
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v t. George, Utah 84770 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT in Case No. 
18232, postage prepaid, this ./~~y of November, 1982, to 
David S. Dolowitz, Attorney for Appellant, at 185 South State 
Street, P. O. Box 11898, Salt L~~,~' Utah )74147._,,1 • ,--r--~~ 
\ .:Hans Q. Chamberlain \ ... , I 
~~-~--..; 
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